Meinong's Theory of Non-Existent Objects

Dissertation, Temple University (2002)
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Abstract

The argument is an investigation of the philosophy of Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong. There are three chapters. The first chapter argues that there are non-existent objects. It is argued that negative existential statements have a simple subject-predicate logical form. The conclusion follows from this premise, together with realist assumptions about truth and predication. Positive and negative existential statements have subject-predicate logical form, I argue, because; that is the grammatical form they appear to have, and the alternative analysis of their logical form is unable to explain certain features of positive and negative existential statements. ;The second chapter presents Meinong's theory and explains his terminology. Meinong was primarily interested in the phenomenon of intentionality, and developed his own technical idiom. An assumption is a mental state, akin to judgment but without the element of conviction. It refers to a circumstance, which is a mind-independent arrangement of objects. Intending an object is a matter of assuming a circumstance. Two theses characterize Meinong's thought. The Principle of Independence: Objects can be in positive predicative circumstances, even when they are not in positive existential circumstances. And the Principle of Indifference: An object is equally adapted to entering into both positive and negative existential circumstances. ;The third chapter examines issues arising from charges that Meinong's theory is inconsistent. Meinong's theory is not inconsistent. Logical re-constructions of Meinong's theory, however, exploit primitive logical distinctions that lack a clear metaphysical justification. Meinong's technical notion of a modal moment is suited to the solution of difficulties Meinong was unaware of, and has been neglected by Meinong's other commentators

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Andrew Jorgensen
Temple University (PhD)

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