Russell's Critique of Meinong's Theory of Objects

Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):375-401 (1985)
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Abstract

Russell brought three arguments forward against Meinong's theory of objects. None of them depend upon a misinterpretation of the theory as is often claimed. In particular, only one is based upon a clash between Meinong's theory and Russell's theory of descriptions, and that did not involve Russell's attributing to Meinong his own ontological assumption. The other two arguments were attempts to find internal inconsistencies in Meinong's theory. But neither was sufficient to refute the theory, though they do require some revisions, viz. a trade-off between freedom of assumption and unhmited characterization. Meinong himself worked out the essentials of the required revisions.

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