Meinong on Intending

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):415-427 (2013)
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In this paper I want to examine Meinong’s account of what it is to think about a particular object in the context of issues that have preoccupied twentieth-century philosophy of language. The central interpretive task is to determine what Meinong might have said about cases of intending where the object is referred to by means of a proper name. The two theoretical notions at the heart of Meinong’s account of intending, intending by way of being and intending by way of being-so, are a species of singling an object out by means of an associated description. Since Kripke’s landmark discussion, it is widely denied that descriptive accounts furnish an adequate account of intending. I will consider whether Meinong’s account has the resources to provide reassurance on this matter and whether the descriptive nature of his account raises other difficulties.



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Andrew Jorgensen
Temple University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Frege’nin Özel Ad Kuramındaki Sonsuz Gerileme Sorunu.Alper Yavuz - 2018 - In Vedat Kamer & Şafak Ural (eds.), VIII. Mantık Çalıştayı Kitabı. İstanbul: Mantık Derneği Yayınları. pp. 513-527.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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