How Do We Know Things with Signs? A Model of Semiotic Intentionality

IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 10 (4):3683-3704 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Intentionality may be dealt with in two different ways: either ontologically, as an ordinary relation to some extraordinary objects, or epistemologically, as an extraordinary relation to some ordinary objects. This paper endorses the epistemological view in order to provide a model of semiotic intentionality defined as the meaning-and-cognizing process that constitutes to power of the mind to be about something on the basis of a semiotic system. After a short introduction that presents the components of semiotic intentionality (viz. sign, act, content, referent) along with their division into an intending and a fulfilling side (Sect. 1), the first main part of the paper analyzes semiotic intentionality at its primary level (a.k.a. 'concrete intentionality') as a real and subjective relation between meaning-intending and meaning-fulfilling acts grounded in the manipulation of some semiotic system (Sect. 2). Then, building on such concrete intentionality, the second main part of the paper analyzes semiotic intentionality at its secondary level (a.k.a. 'abstract intentionality') as an ideal and objective relation between intentional and fulfillment contents, which in turn: (i) proceed from an abstraction performed on the intending and fulfilling acts, respectively, and (ii) retroactively categorize the intending and fulfilling acts, respectively (Sect. 3). Finally, from this combination of an act-based conception of content with a presentationalist account of intentionality, the conclusion of this paper produces the intended model of semiotic intentionality in such a way that knowledge and truth are then respectively defined in it as the subjective correspondence between the two acts of concrete intentionality and as the objective correspondence between the two contents of abstract intentionality (Sect. 4).



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Toward a Phenomenological Epistemology of Mathematical Logic.Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2018 - Synthèse: An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 195 (2):863-874.
Hard Problems of Intentionality.Marc Rowlands - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):741-746.
Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 79--102.
Intentionality and Content in McDowell.Patrice Philie - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):656-678.
Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
The Role of Valence in Intentionality.David Leech Anderson - 2017 - Mind and Matter 15 (1):71-90.
The fiction of phenomenal intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.


Added to PP

69 (#237,875)

6 months
12 (#219,036)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Manuel Gustavo Isaac
EPFL - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

How To Conceptually Engineer Conceptual Engineering?Manuel Gustavo Isaac - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1973 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.

View all 124 references / Add more references