18 found
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  1.  81
    The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language.Nicholas Georgalis - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    In this highly original monograph, Nicholas Georgalis proposes that the concept of minimal content is fundamental both to the philosophy of mind and to the philosophy of language. He argues that to understand mind and language requires minimal content -- a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept that represents the subject of an agent's intentional state as the agent conceives it. Orthodox third-person objective methodology must be supplemented with first-person subjective methodology. Georgalis demonstrates limitations of a strictly third-person methodology in the study (...)
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  2. On Frege's Supposed Hierarchy of Senses.Nicholas Georgalis - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has no ontological significance (...)
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  3. Mind, Language and Subjectivity: Minimal Content and the Theory of Thought.Nicholas Georgalis - 2015 - Routledge.
    In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of ‘thought-tokens’ and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both ‘externalist’ accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of (...)
     
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  4. The Fiction of Phenomenal Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.
    This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of (...)
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  5.  73
    A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (7):475-495.
    I present Searle’s theory of intentionality and defend it against some objections. I then significantly extend his theory by exposing and incorporating an ambiguity in the question as to what an intentional state is about as between a subjective and an objective reading of the question. Searle implicitly relies on this ambiguity while applying his theory to a solution to the problem of substitution in propositional attitudes, but his failure to explicitly accommodate the ambiguity undermines his solution. My extension of (...)
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  6. Representation and the First-Person Perspective.Nicholas Georgalis - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):281-325.
    The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.
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  7. Rethinking Burge's Thought Experiment.Nicholas Georgalis - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):145-64.
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  8.  64
    Asymmetry of Access to Intentional States.Nicholas Georgalis - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (2):185-211.
  9.  40
    Thinking Differently About Thought.Nicholas Georgalis - 2019 - In Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 170-187.
    A new theory of thought is introduced based on a distinction between thought-tokens and thoughts; thought-tokens map many-one to the sentences that express them. What an agent is thinking on a given occasion constitutes her thought-token. Thought-tokens are given expression via a sentence uttered in a public language. Such sentences have determinate standard contents but the thought-tokens they express frequently do not. Moreover, the contents of thought-tokens of various agents may differ significantly, yet our common linguistic practices of thought attribution (...)
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  10.  40
    Intentionality and Representation.Nicholas Georgalis - 1986 - International Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):45-58.
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  11. Burge's Thought Experiment: Still in Need of Defense. [REVIEW]Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):267-273.
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  12.  45
    Mind, Brain, and Chaos.Nicholas Georgalis - 2000 - In The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, affect and self-organization. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: pp. 179-201.
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  13.  76
    First-Person Methodologies: A View From Outside the Phenomenological Tradition.Nicholas Georgalis - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):93-112.
    It is argued that results from first-person methodologies are unacceptable for incorporation into a fundamental philosophical theory of the mind unless they satisfy a necessary condition, which I introduce and defend. I also describe a narrow, nonphenomenal, first-person concept that I call minimal content that satisfies this condition. Minimal content is irreducible to third-person concepts, but it is required for an adequate account of intentionality, representation, and language. Consequently, consciousness is implicated in these as strongly—but differently—than it is in our (...)
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  14.  40
    PostScript.Nicholas Georgalis - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):121-126.
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  15.  32
    Reference Remains Inscrutable.Nicholas Georgalis - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):123–129.
  16.  31
    Ontology Downgraded All the Way.Nicholas Georgalis - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):238–256.
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  17.  27
    Review. [REVIEW]Nicholas Georgalis - 1989 - Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (6):745-748.
  18.  18
    Review: A Realist's Teleological View of Belief. [REVIEW]Nicholas Georgalis - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):85 - 88.