Abstract
Collingwood wrote at a time when positivism was the dominant philosophical influence in British philosophy. Central to Collingwood's philosophical project was the task of rehabilitation of metaphysics against the backdrop of the positivistic deconstruction of metaphysics. Collingwood's defence of metaphysics is much nuanced in the sense that while Collingwood does not sympathize with the grandiose conception of metaphysics associated with traditional metaphysics he is nonetheless keen to argue for the possibility of metaphysics in some form by reconceptualising metaphysics as a science of absolute presuppositions. Thus his reform of metaphysics is an answer to positivism at the same time an attempt to tone down the claims of metaphysics such as to bring it in accord with scientific rationality. Yet it remains to be seen whether Collingwood's rehabilitation of metaphysics is successful, so far as the so-called absolute presuppositions do not have any ontological bearing with the domain of reality as it is in-itself but are exclusively grounded as structural features of human rationality, writ large. In this sense, Collingwood's initiative appears to suffer from similar difficulties that bedevil its Kantian predecessor in reforming metaphysics in terms of the claims of his Copernican revolution in epistemology