This article focuses on the completely neglected relation between Collingwood and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics by highlighting their respective reactions to Alfred J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap. In his article “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” from 1931, Carnap exposed the metaphysical statements, used by Heidegger in his inaugural lecture What is Metaphysics?, as pseudo-statements. Three years later, Ayer published the article “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics”.In the late 1930s, Ayer's position was attacked by Collingwood in (...) An Essay on Metaphysics. In the British debate, the tables of the German debate were thus turned. Whereas the analytic philosopher Carnap reacted against the metaphysician Heidegger, the metaphysician Collingwood reacted against the analytic philosopher Ayer. Accordingly, a correct understanding and evaluation of the relation between Collingwood's and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics are dependent on knowledge of their respective reactions to Ayer and Carnap.Three steps are taken. First, the discussion between Carnap and Heidegger is presented. Second, the friction between Ayer and Collingwood is outlined. In the final section, the similarities and differences between Collingwood and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics are explored and situated within their divergent views on the Western history of philosophy. (shrink)

This article explores the differences between Marcel Gauchet and Charles Taylor with respect to their theories of secularization. It starts by looking at their resemblances; it continues by distinguishing a two-fold difference in their approach. The variation within their similar methodologies is examined, and then the consequences of these divergent definitions of religion are investigated. We focus on four themes: the role of the Axial religions, the significance of Incarnation and Reformation, the significance of Christianity as the ‘religion of the (...) departure from religion’, and the possibility of religious ‘conversion’. Taylor's and Gauchet's views on the future of religion diverge as a function of their different interpretations of ‘fulfilment’ and ‘hunger for meaning’. (shrink)

Charles Taylor’s monumental book A Secular Age has been extensively discussed, criticized, and worked on. This volume, by contrast, explores ways of working with Taylor’s book, especially its potentials and limits for individual research projects. Due to its wide reception, it has initiated a truly interdisciplinary object of study; with essays drawn from various research fields, this volume fosters substantial conversation across disciplines.

when r. g. collingwood began to write his autobiography in 1938, he was only 49 years old, still very young for drawing up a final balance. Only three years earlier, he had been appointed to the prestigious Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy in Oxford. By then, Collingwood was already severely ill and he knew that he only had a few more years to live. Therefore, he did not only present his past evolution in his autobiography; his attention rather went to (...) those subjects for which he feared there was not enough time left to elaborate. The project that in his mind deserved the most attention was the defence of the possibility of a contemporary metaphysics. Less than one year later, Collingwood elaborated this .. (shrink)

Although the philosophical ideas of the English philosopher Robin George Collingwood on history and art have often been compared with those of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, an in-depth comparison between their concepts of metaphysics was never made. Therefore, the focus in this article is on both authors’ concepts of metaphysics. It is shown that, despite the undeniable affinity, their views of the status of metaphysics differ substantially. Both Dilthey and Collingwood focus on an inherent antinomy in the project of (...) metaphysics. On the one hand, there is the inescapable relativity of all time-bound ways of thinking and their results; on the other, there is the metaphysical search for objective and generally accepted knowledge of reality as a whole. For Dilthey, the awareness of its historical character reveals the impossibility for metaphysics to provide a foundation for natural and human sciences alike. Collingwood’s aim, by contrast, is to safeguard the possibility of metaphysics as a historical science to supply an enduring foundation of natural and human sciences. To clarify this radical difference with regard to the role of metaphysics, I make three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics within the context of his work in order to present his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Finally, I relate the different status of their views of metaphysics to their divergent interpretations of human finitude. (shrink)

Both in An Autobiography and in An Essay on Metaphysics R.G. Collingwood defines the study of metaphysics as primarily at any time an attempt to discover the absolute presuppositions of thinking and secondarily as an attempt to discover the corresponding absolute presuppositions of other peoples and other times, and to follow the historical process by which one set of presuppositions has turned into another. In addition, he states that the distinction between what is true and what is false does not (...) apply to them. The objection often raised against this definition is that it has nothing to do with metaphysics in the traditional sense and that it only refers to a history of ideas. In this article I try to show the link between Collingwood's apparently idiosyncratic definition of metaphysics and the traditional one. I, therefore, have to sketch the background against which Collingwood's concept of metaphysics and the peculiar terminology he makes use of must be interpreted. This reconstruction of the original background is necessary in order to make clear what Collingwood means by his project of a „reformed metaphysics" as a historical inquiry into the absolute presuppositions of human thinking about reality. (shrink)

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In the first part of this critical study on Herman De Dijn’s Vloeibare waarden, I offer a concise presentation of the central ideas in this book against the backdrop of Zygmunt Bauman’s view of late modernity. In the second part, I try to characterize De Dijn’s so-called conservatism with the assistance of a few quotations from the work of Leszek Kolakowski, a Polish philosopher with whom De Dijn feels congenial. In the third part, I make two critical observations concerning De (...) Dijn’s position in his book. Finally, I make a passing remark as to the philosophical importance of what Hannah Arendt calls ”dangerous thinking’. (shrink)

Many critics observe a methodological flaw in Taylor’s work. They claim that there is an alleged discrepancy between Taylor’s historical approach on the one hand and his defense of fullness in term...

Given the fact that both R.G. Collingwood and P.F. Strawson introduced, inspired by Kant, a 'reform of metaphysics' and thereby used a strikingly similar terminology, the absence of an extensive article about the comparison between their concepts of a 'reformed metaphysics' is, to say the least, rather surprising. The first aim of this article is filling up this gap. But there is more at stake. Traditionally, a twofold connection is laid between their concepts of metaphysics. First, there is the fact (...) that both authors consider metaphysics as a reflexion about the basic presuppositions of our thought and so subscribe to Kant's 'reform of metaphysics'. Subsequently, the central point of difference to be considered is that Strawson sets basic presuppositions as universal and invariable and so more directly leans against Kant than Collingwood who ascribes to these presuppositions a variable and cultural-historical character. In this article — and that is its central aim — I would like to make some critical remarks to this interpretation. First, I try to show how the resemblances between their concepts of metaphysics originate from their adoption of both Kants 'Copernican revolution' and his repudiation of transcendent metaphysics. Furthermore, I want to point out the differences between both their concepts of metaphysics, starting from their respective interpretations of Kant s transcendental idealism. While Strawson propounds an 'anodyne' interpretation of transcendental idealism, Collingwood proposes a 'radicalization' of transcendental idealism. Against the backdrop of these different interpretations, the contrast between the universal character of Strawson's metaphysics and the so-called historical-relativist character of Collingwood s metaphysics can be clarified. Finally, I will dwell on six repercussions of both their views of metaphysics. (shrink)

Abstract Is `History Man', Fred Inglis' biography on R.G. Collingwood a successful biography? Inglis' explicit ambition is to portray the concrete figure Collingwood by abducting him from what he calls the vacuum-packed academic world of scholars. But the best biographers look for a balanced equilibrium between rendering philosophical ideas and dramatizing a philosopher's life. Put another way, they evoke the interweaving of a philosopher's thought with the vicissitudes of his life. Despite the unmistakable qualities of this biography, Fred Inglis did (...) not fully succeed in finding that very balance, mainly due to a lack of philosophical background. While Oxford University Press with the new edition of his works and manuscripts is thoroughly reorienting the traditional view of Collingwood, Inglis' fluently written but rather biased portrayal does no full justice to the heart of his fascinating philosophy and personality. (shrink)

Secularization, A Multi-Layered Concept. On the Vicissitudes of Sociological and Philosophical Theories of Secularization This article focuses on the historical evolution of the concept of ‘secularization’ in sociology and philosophy. It does not include a description of political systems and their approach to religion and secularity. The authors dwell on the classic secularization thesis and explain how this thesis was questioned in sociology and philosophy alike. The secularization debate nowadays counts many participants reflecting diverging normative positions. Despite this multitude of (...) positions and nuances, the debate is likely to continue in the future along two particular strands: first, discussions on the use of concepts as secular/post-secular and the tenability of the religious/secular divide; second, discussions that will revolve around western modernity/multiple modernities, or ‘the West versus the rest’. (shrink)

This article focuses both on the multifarious personality of Jos Decorte and on the primary themes that recur throughout his writings in light of his death in a tragic traffic accident fourteen years ago. Being a scholar in medieval philosophy, Decorte’s main purpoie was not only to rehabilitate the pivotal role that each of the aforementioned thinkers played within the evolution of medieval philosophy, but to apply their insights to contemporary problems as well. To that end, he wished to transform (...) Henry of Ghent’s ontology of relations and Cusanus’ conjectural ontology into subtler forms that could be adjusted to the predicaments of twentieth century philosophy. Wavering between the tradition of metaphysics and that of negative theology, he defined his own project as striving towards an ideal that, albeit not rationally grounded, could give rise to different and interrelated ramifications of rationality. Finally, it is shown how that ideal was reflected in his strong engagement, alike in his personal and in academic life. (shrink)

Emphasising the cultural, historical and sociological aspects of reason – aspects that were not considered neither by Kant nor by Garve – in his Metakritik über den Purismum der Vernunft , Johann Georg Hamann has not only become the ‘founding father’ of the romantic Sturm und Drang. He has inaugurated a specific kind of criticism as well that will gradually leave its mark upon the philosophical scene from the end of the nineteenth century up till now. In this article, I (...) would like to focus upon the influence that was exerted by Hamann’s metacritique on the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of culture, as it becomes obvious in the work of, among others, R.G. Collingwood, Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor. (shrink)

‘As in a view from afar’. Vondel’s epistemological objections to Spinoza’s circle From a philosophical and theological stance, Spinoza and Vondel are traditionally portrayed as downright antipodes. Whereas Spinoza is seen as a pre-eminent representative of ‘radical Enlightenment’, Vondel is generally considered as a rather reactionary author who does not fit at all in this radical version of Enlightenment. The central aim of this article is to modify this generally agreed perception. On the basis of recent historical research in the (...) relation between the circle of Spinoza and Vondel, the affinities between both authors can be brought to the fore, in particular when looking at their writings on the relation between politics and religion. The gap between their views becomes only apparent when their respective views of God are at stake: there is an undeniable contrast between Spinoza’s naturalist pantheism and Vondel’s classic theism. In order to understand that very difference, the focus will be laid on two writings, conceived in more or less the same period: Vondel’s philosophical-theological poem Bespieghelingen van Godt en Godsdienst and Spinoza’s Verhandeling over de verbetering van het verstand (Treatise on the Emendation of Understanding). The central difference between the two authors in these writings relates to their methodological approach of existential questions about God and salvation, in particular to their dissent concerning the epistemological role of the geometrical method and the specific role of language. One of the hypotheses I propound in this respect is that Vondel’s relation to Lodewijk Meyer has been of utmost importance in order to explain their different methodological positions. Finally, I indicate the topical relevance of this methodological difference for contemporary philosophical reflection. (shrink)

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A number of articles have highlighted the resemblances between Collingwood’s and Wittgenstein’s positions in the domains of philosophy of language, anthropology, and logic. The introduction of this essay recalls some aspects of these resem­blan­ces. However, the main difference between the two philosophers con­sists in their attitudes toward metap­hysics. Whereas Wittgenstein’s thesis in On Certainty is that “I know” does not tolerate metaphysical emphasis, Collingwood claims in An Essay on Metaphysics that it is the specific task of metaphysics to articulate our (...) basic presuppositions in their historical transformations. That difference has been noted, but never really examined. Moreover, the majority of Collingwood scholars see no reason why his historical study of basic presuppositions should usurp the name of metaphysics and, therefore, reject the term as an unfortunately chosen one. The main purpose of this essay is to explain why Collingwood’s term “metaphysics” is not so idiosyncratic as it is supposed to be and in what sense his metaphysics differs from Wittgenstein’s approach. (shrink)

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It is generally agreed that R.G.Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method and An Essay on Metaphysics are closely related but are also significantly different. If they do in fact differ in any significant way, one wonders whether there are good reasons to prefer one account over the other at the points where they differ. In this article, I would like to try to answer this query by referring to two passages, where the text in both essays is nearly identical but (...) which nevertheless reveal the differences between the two essays. In these passages Collingwood gives a presentation of Plato's and Kant's philosophical method and compares their methodologies to his own. Precisely the small differences between the two fragments not only show the continuity between both essays, but also make clear how Collingwood's concept of metaphysics after 1936, under the pressure of logical positivism, loses its distinctive sharpness and hence becomes liable to the charge of relativism and historicism. If my analysis has any plausibility, I hope to make it clear that Collingwood's position in EPM is preferable to that of EM or, to put it more mildly, that 'any account of EM must do justice to EPM if we are to allow the rest of Collingwood's philosophy to live and flourish'. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood greatly admired Dilthey’s philosophy of history. In this article, I show that despite the obvious affinities between both authors, their views on the historical role of philosophy are clearly divergent. I focus on one topic in particular in their writings, namely, the status of metaphysics and its relation to history. Whereas Dilthey argues that the awareness of the historicity of metaphysics and its psychological-hermeneutical foundation inevitably leads to the euthanasia of metaphysics, Collingwood defends the possibility of a reform (...) of metaphysics into a historical discipline, based on a logic of question and answer. The analysis of the difference between these two thinkers with respect to the role of metaphysics consists of three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics into the whole of his oeuvre, followed by a presentation of his ”solution’ to the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and on his ”solution’ to the metaphysical antinomy. To that end, I make use of Collingwood’s recently released unpublished manuscripts so as to shed greater light on his rejection of Dilthey’s understanding of the historical role and definition of metaphysics. Finally, I reformulate the differing statuses of metaphysics between these two thinkers by relating their divergent views to their respective understandings of human finitude. (shrink)

In his reply, Guido Vanheeswijck expresses his agreement to the central ‘hunch’ of Mendus’ article with regard to the status of the political standard narrative about the liberal view on the relation between religion and violence. However, taking some distance from Mendus, he tries to make it clear that the relation between violence and religion is obvious, but not inevitable and that the tensions between religion and modernity – couched in a terminological contrast between enchantment and disenchantment – are palpable (...) indeed but not inescapable. (shrink)