Consegue um homem comer um mamute inteiro? Psicologia moral do valor e normatividade
Abstract
The understanding of value in moral naturalism as a descriptivist endeavor will be analized through an
application of the naturalistic fallacy on an evolutive perspective of moral psychology. From a brief
analysis of the naturalistic fallacy as proposed by Dall’Agnol, I’ll criticize the author’s application of
such on what he refers to as moral naturalism. Contrasting E. Wilson’s sociobiology with R. Triver’s
theory of reciprocal altruism I will procure a definition of naturalized ethics by investigating the
psychological roots of moral motivation. Once identified the descriptive and non-reductionist aspects of
contemporary moral naturalism, the naturalistic fallacy presents itself as unbecoming of its hallmark
and metaethical importance, and it becomes clear that a naturalized comprehension of human moral
behavior is vital to the understanding of the motivations for action and the conception of value; though
weak under a normative perspective.