On group lies and lying to oneself: comment on Jennifer Lackey’s The Epistemology of Groups

Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-8 (2023)
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In The Epistemology of Groups, Jennifer Lackey investigates the conditions for the possibility of groups telling lies. Central to this project is the goal of holding groups, and individuals within groups, accountable for their actions. I show that Lackey’s total account of group phenomena, however, may open up a means by which groups can evade accusations of having lied, thus allowing them to evade responsibility in precisely the way Lackey set out to avoid. Along the way, I also take note of some interesting implications of Lackey’s view: that it makes groups uniquely susceptible to a lack of self-knowledge and that it creates an interesting mechanism by which groups can lie to themselves.

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Megan Hyska
Northwestern University

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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans & John Mcdowell - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):534-538.
Shared intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
Group beliefs.Raimo Tuomela - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):285-318.

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