Oxford University Press (2020)

Authors
Jennifer Lackey
Northwestern University
Abstract
Jennifer Lackey presents a ground-breaking exploration of the epistemology of groups, and its implications for group agency and responsibility. She argues that group belief and knowledge depend on what individual group members do or are capable of doing, while being subject to group-level normative requirements.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2021
Buy this book $52.49 new   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780199656608   0199656606
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,039
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Group Lies and the Narrative Constraint.Säde Hormio - forthcoming - Episteme 19 (First View):1-20.
Groups, Attitudes and Speech.Brian Ball - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):817-826.
Group Belief for a Reason.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):1-22.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):341-396.
Epistemic Autonomy and Group Knowledge.Chris Dragos - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6259-6279.
Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
The critique of group belief.Ilya Kasavin - 2016 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 50 (4):63-73.
Gender, Race & Group Disagreement.Martin Miragoli & Mona Simion - 2020 - In Adam Carter & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. pp. 125-138.
Group Lies and Reflections on the Purpose of Social Epistemology.Liam Kofi Bright - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):209-224.
Group Assertion and Group Silencing.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Language & Communication 1 (70):28-37.
Group Belief: Lessons From Lies and Bullshit.I.—Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):185-208.
Social Knowledge and Supervenience Revisited.Mark Povich - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):1033-1043.
Group Peer Disagreement.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):11-28.
On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-12-18

Total views
14 ( #731,687 of 2,505,782 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #73,877 of 2,505,782 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes