Should the beneficiaries pay?

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (2):1470594-13506366 (2015)
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Abstract

Many theorists claim that if an agent benefits from an action that harms others, that agent has a moral duty to compensate those who are harmed, even if the agent did not cause the harm herself. In the debate on climate justice, this idea is commonly referred to as the beneficiary-pays principle . This paper argues that the BPP is implausible, both in the context of climate change and as a normative principle more generally. It should therefore be rejected

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Citations of this work

What Structural Injustice Theory Leaves Out.Daniel Butt - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (5):1161-1175.
The Moral Taintedness of Benefiting from Injustice.Tom Parr - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):985-997.
Benefiting from Injustice and the Common-Source Problem.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):1067-1081.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Climate change and the duties of the advantaged.Simon Caney - 2010 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13 (1):203-228.
Distributing responsibilities.David Miller - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (4):453–471.
On benefiting from injustice.Daniel Butt - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):129-152.

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