Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support

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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564 (2006)
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Abstract

Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.

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10.1353/cjp.2007.0003

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Author Profiles

Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University
E. J. Coffman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Citations of this work

Shifting the burden of proof?Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.
Basic reasons and first philosophy: A coherentist view of reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.

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References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1990 - Boulder, Colo.: Routledge.

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