A quintet, a quartet, a trio, a duo? The epistemic regress problem, evidential support, and skepticism

Philosophia 37 (3):525-534 (2009)
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Abstract

In his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit of paramount epistemic values.

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References found in this work

Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
The Sceptics.R. J. Hankinson - 1995 - Routledge.
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
When infinite regresses are not vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.

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