A quintet, a quartet, a trio, a duo? The epistemic regress problem, evidential support, and skepticism
Philosophia 37 (3):525-534 (2009)
AbstractIn his topical article, Andrew Cling claims that the best extant formulation of the so-called epistemic regress problem rests on five assumptions that are too strong. Cling offers an improved version that rests on a different set of three core epistemic assumptions, each of which he argues for. Despite of owing a great deal to Cling’s ideas, I argue that the epistemic regress problem surfaces from more fundamental assumptions than those offered by Cling. There are ultimately two core assumptions—in fact two contradictory strands within the concept of epistemic support—which jointly create a powerful challenge for our pursuit of paramount epistemic values.
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Epistemic infinitism and the conditional character of inferential justification.Erhan Demircioglu - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2313-2334.
References found in this work
Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.
When infinite regresses are not vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.