No Answer to Hume

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):279 - 284 (2011)
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Abstract

In a recent article in this journal, Daniel Steel charges me with committing a fallacy in my discussion of inductive rules. I show that the charge is false, and that Steel's own attempt to validate enumerative induction in terms of formal learning theory is itself fallacious. I go on to argue that, contra Steel, formal learning theory is in principle incapable of answering Hume's famous claim that any attempt to justify induction will beg the question

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Author's Profile

Colin Howson
Last affiliation: London School of Economics

Citations of this work

The problem of induction.John Vickers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hume’s theorem.Colin Howson - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):339-346.
On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson.Daniel Steel - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):285 - 291.

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
An enquiry concerning human understanding.David Hume - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 112.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.

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