Abstract

The thesis examines the ontology of value in the ethical theories of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume. These three philosophers jointly constitute the moral sense school, in eighteenth century British philosophy. ;Ethical objectivism and ethical subjectivism, as I will use these terms, are contrasting claims about the nature of value. 'Ethical objectivism' refers roughly to any theory according to which moral values are or are logically entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons considering the character and actions of people, and of places and times. 'Ethical subjectivism' refers to any theory which claims that moral values are at least partly constituted by the responses of persons considering character and actions, or dependent on places and times. ;The thesis shows an interesting movement in moral ontology away from the objectivism of Shaftesbury to the subjectivist theory of Hume which effectively highlights some of the interesting differences between the three theories. The thesis is of historical interest since the demonstration of differences in moral ontology makes it less attractive to regard the three theories as a family