Dialectica 61 (2):203–217 (2007)

Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London
According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all
Keywords Davidson   Ethics   Realism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01102.x
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.

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Moral Relativism.Christopher Gowans - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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