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  1.  90
    Non-Rational Aspects of Skilled Agency.Yannig Luthra - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2267-2289.
    This paper criticizes two closely connected rationalist views about human agency. The first of these views, rationalism about agential control, claims that the capacities for agential control in normal adult human beings are rational capacities. The second view, rationalism about action, claims that the capacities for agential control in virtue of which the things we do count as our actions are rational capacities. The arguments of the paper focus on aspects of technical skills that control integral details of skillful action, (...)
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  2.  72
    Epistemic Akrasia and the Fallibility of Critical Reasoning.Cristina Borgoni & Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):877-886.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain (...)
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  3.  73
    Self-Trust and Knowledge of Action.Yannig Luthra - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (9):471-491.
    This paper argues that you have non-observational warrant for beliefs about the body in action. For example, if you mean to be drinking a cup of water, you can know independently of observation that you are moving your body in a way that is effective in enabling you to drink. The case I make centers on the claim that you have default warrant to trust your agency. You do well to trust your agency just in virtue of your status as (...)
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  4.  42
    Aristotle on Choosing Virtuous Action for its Own Sake.Yannig Luthra - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):423-441.
    While Aristotle claims that virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sakes, he also claims that many virtuous actions are to be chosen as instrumental means to securing further ends. It would seem that an action is choiceworthy for its own sake only if it would be choiceworthy whether or not it served further ends. How, then, can such virtuous actions be choiceworthy for their own sakes? This article criticizes John Ackrill's and Jennifer Whiting's answers to this question. I propose (...)
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