Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations

Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533 (2014)
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Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one major objection to interpreting our judgments about Gettier cases as strict conditionals.



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Author Profiles

Thomas Grundmann
University of Cologne
Joachim Horvath
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Citations of this work

Intuition.Joel Pust - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Thought Experiments.Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James R. Brown - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 25 (1):135-142.
Philosophical expertise beyond intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.

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References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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