6 found
Order:
  1. Pregnancy, Parthood and Proper Overlap: A Critique of Kingma.Alexander Geddes - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):476-491.
    Elselijn Kingma argues that, in cases of mammalian placental pregnancy, the foster (roughly, the post-implantation embryo/foetus) is part of the gravida (the pregnant organism). But she does not consider the possibility of proper overlap. I show that this generates a number of serious problems for her argument and trace the oversight to a quite general issue within the literature on biological individuality. Doing so provides an opportunity to pull apart and clarify the relations between some importantly distinct questions concerning organismality (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. Judgements about Thought Experiments.Alexander Geddes - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):35-67.
    Thought experiments invite us to evaluate philosophical theses by making judgements about hypothetical cases. When the judgements and the theses conflict, it is often the latter that are rejected. But what is the nature of the judgements such that they are able to play this role? I answer this question by arguing that typical judgements about thought experiments are in fact judgements of normal counterfactual sufficiency. I begin by focusing on Anna-Sara Malmgren’s defence of the claim that typical judgements about (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  3.  47
    Conscious Experience: What's in It for Me?Léa Salje & Alexander Geddes - 2023 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Marie Guillot (eds.), Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford: OUP. pp. 27–49.
    A number of philosophers claim that reflection on the subjective or phenomenal character of conscious experience reveals the universal involvement of a certain feature—‘for-me-ness’, or ‘mine-ness’, or ‘a sense of mine-ness’—whose presence is often overlooked or denied. The first half of this chapter canvasses several possible interpretations of these phrases, identifies some ways in which their use tends to be problematically equivocal, and ends with a clear and minimal statement of what the feature is supposed to be. The second half (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Resolving the puzzle of the changing past.Alexander Geddes - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Barlassina and Del Prete argue that the past can change, on the basis that there is no other explanation for the truth values of certain claims involving the past-tense predicate ‘won the Tour de France in 2000’. To establish this, they argue that no contextualist account of this predicate will be able to explain these truth values. I show that their argument straightforwardly fails. Not only does a tweak to the contextualist account they consider suffice to explain these truth values, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Think Twice, It's All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self.Alexander Geddes - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):371-380.
    According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases—cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity—are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne (2010) has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne's arguments are flawed, and that animalism is capable of handling the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6.  24
    Resolving a puzzle about the fixity of the past.Alexander Geddes - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):683-690.
    In his 2022 article ‘A puzzle about the fixity of the past’, Lampert argues that standard views concerning knowledge and the semantics of ‘actually’ conflict with a widely held principle concerning the fixity of the past. I show that his attempt to establish the conflict fails, as it rests on the implicit assumption that a past mental state or utterance involving a modal indexical must have the same content across worlds with a shared past, when in fact it must, given (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark