Actual utility, the mismatch problem, and the move to expected utility

Philosophical Studies 174 (12):3097-3108 (2017)
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Abstract

The mismatch problem for consequentialism arises whenever the theory delivers mismatched verdicts between a group act and the individual acts that compose it. A natural thought is that moving to expected utility versions of consequentialism will solve this problem. I explain why the move to expected utility is not successful.

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10.1007/s11098-016-0848-3

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Robert Gruber
Springfield College

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Do I Make a Difference?Shelly Kagan - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2):105-141.
Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm: A Reply to Kagan.Julia Nefsky - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (4):364-395.
Puppies, pigs, and people: Eating meat and marginal cases.Alastair Norcross - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):229–245.
Utilitarianism and vegetarianism.Peter Singer - 1980 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (4):325-337.

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