Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View

In Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford, UK: pp. 201-221 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter concerns the nature of our obligations as individuals when it comes to our emissions-producing activities and climate change. The first half of the chapter argues that the popular ‘expected utility’ approach to this question faces a problematic dilemma: either it gives skeptical verdicts, saying that there are no such obligations, or it yields implausibly strong verdicts. The second half of the chapter diagnoses the problem. It is argued that the dilemma arises from a very general feature of the view, and thus is shared by other views as well. The chapter then discusses what an account of our individual obligations needs to look like if it is to avoid the dilemma. Finally, the discussion is extended beyond climate change to other collective impact contexts.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Climate Change and Individual Duties.Augustin Fragnière - 2016 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews.
It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard B. Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change. Elsevier. pp. 221–253.
Reducing Personal Emissions in Response to Collective Harm.Cassidy Robertson - 2021 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 34 (2):1-13.
Climate Change, Individual Emissions, and Foreseeing Harm.Chad Vance - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (5):562-584.
Robust Individual Responsibility for Climate Harms.Gianfranco Pellegrino - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):811-823.
Climate Change, Individual Obligations and the Virtue of Justice.Ryan Darr - 2019 - Studies in Christian Ethics 32 (3):326-340.
Climate Change—Do I Make a Difference?Bernward Gesang - 2017 - Environmental Ethics 39 (1):3-19.
On individual and shared obligations: in defense of the activist’s perspective.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - In Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press.
Collective action problems and conflicting obligations.Brian Talbot - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2239-2261.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-06

Downloads
885 (#16,532)

6 months
251 (#9,532)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Julia Nefsky
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

Should I Offset or Should I Do More Good?H. Orri Stefansson - 2022 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 25 (3):225-241.
Climate Change and Decision Theory.Andrea S. Asker & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2023 - In Pellegrino Gianfranco & Marcello Di Paola (eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Climate Change. Springer Nature. pp. 267-286.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Oxford University Press USA.
Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

View all 26 references / Add more references