A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling

Theory and Decision 50 (3):249-262 (2001)
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Abstract

This paper argues that any specific utility or disutility for gambling must be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is consequential while a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a matter of process, not of consequences. A utility for gambling is modeled as a process utility which monotonically combines with expected utility restricted to consequences. This allows for a process utility for gambling to be revealed. As an illustration, the model shows how empirical observations in the Allais paradox can reveal a process disutility of gambling. A more general model of rational behavior combining processes and consequences is then proposed and discussed.

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References found in this work

Pensées.B. Pascal - 1670/1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 60:111-112.
Towards a more precise decision framework.Robin Pope - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (3):241-265.

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