A Critique of Thomistic Dualism

In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 123–131 (2018)
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Abstract

The Thomistic doctrine of the soul as the form of the body has many of the right intentions. It aims to promote a close integration of soul and body, and more broadly of the human person with the overall world of nature. Emergent dualism responds that all creatures possess souls if the biological organism has developed in a way that enables it to be the “emergence base” for a soul. This chapter explains a brief survey of Aquinas's view of the soul, following the exposition of that view by Eleonore Stump. The human soul is different from other subsistent immaterial forms, in that the human soul, unlike an angel, does configure matter. The distinctive nature of the human soul, as contrasted with the souls of animals, makes it plain that humans are not merely animals; rather, they are “rational animals”, with all that implies.

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William Hasker
Huntington University

Citations of this work

Since when have humans had a soul?Andreas May - 2022 - HTS Theological Studies 78 (2).
Coherence of Substance Dualism.Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad - 2023 - International Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):33-42.

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