On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if )

Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349 (2009)
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Abstract

What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and turn out to be equivalent. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this?

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Anthony Gillies
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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References found in this work

On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Defaults in update semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.
Indicative conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.

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