Mind 104 (414):235-329 (1995)
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| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) |
| Keywords | Counterfactuals |
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| DOI | 10.1093/mind/104.414.235 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Bayesian Philosophy of Science: Variations on a Theme by the Reverend Thomas Bayes.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.
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