Valid Arguments as True Conditionals

Mind 132 (526):428-451 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper explores an idea of Stoic descent that is largely neglected nowadays, the idea that an argument is valid when the conditional formed by the conjunction of its premises as antecedent and its conclusion as consequent is true. As it will be argued, once some basic features of our naıve understanding of validity are properly spelled out, and a suitable account of conditionals is adopted, the equivalence between valid arguments and true conditionals makes perfect sense. The account of validity outlined here, which displays one coherent way to articulate the Stoic intuition, accords with standard formal treatments of deductive validity and encompasses an independently grounded characterization of inductive validity

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Andrea Iacona
Università di Torino

Citations of this work

Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.
Naïve Truth and the Evidential Conditional.Iacona Andrea & Lorenzo Rossi - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1:1-26.
Arguments, Suppositions, and Conditionals.Pavese Carlotta - forthcoming - Semantics and Linguistic Theory.

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References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.

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