Is Stalnaker inconsistent about indicative conditionals?

Abstract

Stalnaker's 1975 motivates an account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals that seems in tension with the truth-conditions he offers. This paper discusses how best to resolve this tension.

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2009-01-28

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Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Conversation and conditionals.J. Robert G. Williams - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.

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References found in this work

Indicative conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.

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