Value After Death

Ratio 35 (3):194-203 (2022)
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Abstract

Does our life have value for us after we die? Despite the importance of such a question, many would find it absurd, even incoherent. Once we are dead, the thought goes, we are no longer around to have any wellbeing at all. However, in this paper I argue that this common thought is mistaken. In order to make sense of some of our most central normative thoughts and practices, we must hold that a person can have wellbeing after they die. I provide two arguments for this claim on the basis of postmortem harms and benefits as well as the lasting significance of death. I suggest two ways of underwriting posthumous wellbeing.

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Christopher Frugé
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Permanent Value.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):356-372.

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References found in this work

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Welfare, happiness, and ethics.L. W. Sumner - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1983 - Religious Studies 19 (1):96-99.

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