Permanent Value

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):356-372 (2022)
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Abstract

Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives won’t matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives won’t make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this paper, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this stronger version, we do not have personal value after death, so our past life no longer has wellbeing after we die. The standard objections to the standard interpretation don’t apply to this more nihilistic nihilism. I offer a new response according to which personal value persists after death because the person continues to exist.

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Christopher Frugé
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Value After Death.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Ratio 35 (3):194-203.
Combining Good and Bad.Christopher Frugé - forthcoming - In Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Perspectives on Ill-Being. Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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