Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence

Philosophy of Science 90 (4):937-957 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amidst times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this paper we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of ‘fast science’ should respond, and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientific controversies, we argue for the importance of ‘higher-order evidence’ (HOE) and we specify desiderata for scientifically relevant HOE. We use our account to analyze the controversy about the aerosol transmission of COVID-19.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.
Using science, making policy: what should we worry about?Eleonora Montuschi - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):57-78.
Developing transdisciplinary practices: an interplay between disagreement and trust.Luana Poliseli & Clarissa Machado Pinto Leite - 2021 - In David Ludwig, Inkeri Koskinen, Zinhle Mncube, Luana Poliseli & Luis Reyes-Galindo (eds.), Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science. Routledge. pp. 77-91.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-10-06

Downloads
414 (#50,118)

6 months
185 (#16,877)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Daniel C. Friedman
Stanford University
Dunja Šešelja
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Citations of this work

Fast Science.Jacob Stegenga - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
The Epistemic and the Zetetic.Jane Friedman - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):501-536.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.

View all 36 references / Add more references