Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345 (2014)
Authors |
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Abstract |
Recent authors have drawn attention to a new kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as
higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the
result of a flawed process – for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I
argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of
justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some
situations involving higher-order defeaters the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting
recommendations. For instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend
judgment in p. I discuss three responses. The first resists the puzzle by arguing that there is only
one correct epistemic rule, an Über-rule. The second accepts that there are genuine epistemic
dilemmas. The third appeals to a hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out
problems for all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw from the puzzle is that
a state can be epistemically rational or justified even if one has what looks to be strong evidence
to think that it is not. As such, the considerations put forth constitute a non question-begging
argument for a kind of externalism.
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Keywords | defeat higher-order defeat higher-order evidence epistemic norms epistemic rules rationality |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12090 |
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
View all 22 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Enkrasia or Evidentialism? Learning to Love Mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
View all 163 citations / Add more citations
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