Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):156-165 (2019)

Abstract
In a recent paper on Goodman's paradox, I have argued that ‘grue’ is unprojectible because the grue-evidence is doxastically dependent on the evidence that the samples are examined before t. Christopher Dorst replies that doxastic dependence is unable to yield a language-independent asymmetry with respect to ‘green’ and ‘grue’ and hence cannot resolve Goodman's paradox. In this response I hope to show that Dorst's considerations are flawed: his argument for the language-relativity of doxastic dependence is inconclusive at best—even if his construal of doxastic dependence were correct. It is incorrect, however: Dorst mistakes counterfactual dependence of beliefs for belief in counterfactual dependence. I will also argue that doxastic dependence properly understood is not threatened by any of his objections.
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqy029
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References found in this work BETA

A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and Database Updating.Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Fact, Fiction and Forecast.Edward H. Madden - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (2):271-273.
Grue.Frank Jackson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (5):113-131.
I Bet You'll Solve Goodman's Riddle.Wolfgang Freitag - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):254-267.
Bet Accepted: A Reply to Freitag.Christopher Dorst - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):175-183.

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