Dialectica 70 (2):185-200 (2016)

The paper explores the disjunctive riddle for induction: If we know the sample Ks to be P, we also know that they are P or F. Assuming that we also know that the future Ks are non-P, we can conclude that they are F, if only we can inductively infer the evidentially supported P-or-F hypothesis. Yet this is absurd. We cannot predict that future Ks are F based on the knowledge that the samples, and only they, are P. The ensuing challenge is to account for the unprojectibility of the disjunctive hypothesis. I provide an explanation in terms of epistemic dependence. The P-or-F hypothesis is unprojectible because the evidence supporting it depends epistemically on the evidence for the defeated P-hypothesis. The paper also shows that the disjunctive riddle covers the essence of Goodman's infamous grue-problem, which, therefore, can be resolved by the same means: In contrast to the green-hypothesis, the grue-hypothesis is unprojectible because the grue-evidence depends on the evidence for a defeated hypothesis.
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DOI 10.1111/1746-8361.12136
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-20.
Against Grue Mysteries.Alexandra Zinke - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):1023-1033.

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Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
Goodman's New Riddle of Induction.Dean Lubin - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):61-63.
Disjunctive Predicates.David H. Sanford - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.
Goodman's Paradox.Shui-Chuen Lee - 1981 - Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale


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