Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control

Synthese 194 (8):2811-2842 (2017)
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The aim of this paper is to argue that doxastic responsibility, i.e., responsibility for holding a certain doxastic attitude, is not based on direct doxastic control. There are two different kinds of direct doxastic control to be found in the literature, intentional doxastic control and evaluative doxastic control. Although many epistemologists agree that we do not have intentional doxastic control over our doxastic attitudes, it has been argued that we have evaluative doxastic control over the majority of our doxastic attitudes. This has led to the assumption that doxastic responsibility is based on evaluative doxastic control. In the first part of this paper I will introduce the notion of doxastic responsibility and the framework of doxastic guidance control as well as the approaches to direct and indirect doxastic control. I will then argue that doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control by showing that doxastic responsibility is neither based on intentional nor on evaluative doxastic control



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Andrea Robitzsch (née Kruse)
Universität Osnabrück

Citations of this work

Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control.J. AdamCarter - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):283-304.

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References found in this work

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.

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