Counterfactuals and the 'Grue-Speaker'

Abstract

Freitag (2015) and Schramm (2014) have proposed different, although converging, solutions of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Answering their proposals, Dorst (2016 and 2018) has used the fictitious character of a ‘grue-speaker’ as his principal device for criticizing counterfactual-based treatments of the Riddle. In this paper, I argue that Dorst’s arguments fail: On the observation of no other than green emeralds, the ‘grue-speaker’ cannot use the symmetry between the ‘green’- and ‘grue’-languages for claiming ‘grue’- instead of ‘green’-evidence, and the counterfactuals involved (explicitly by Schramm and implicitly by Freitag) remain unaffected by Dorst’s proposal for how to evaluate them.

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Alfred Schramm
University of Graz

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References found in this work

Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic.David Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
Two Conceptions of Similarity.Ben Blumson - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):21-37.
A query on confirmation.Nelson Goodman - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (14):383-385.
Grue.Frank Jackson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (5):113-131.
Goodman’s Problem and Scientific Methodology.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):573 - 590.

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