Two conceptions of response-dependence

Philosophical Studies 107 (2):159-177 (2002)
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Abstract

The traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.

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2009-01-28

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Rafael De Clercq
Lingnan University

Citations of this work

How Do Technological Artefacts Embody Moral Values?Michael Klenk - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (3):525-544.
The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
The structure of aesthetic properties.Rafael De Clercq - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):894-909.
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States.Julie Zahle - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4):493-518.

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References found in this work

Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Routledge.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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