Judgment Under Uncertainty Revisited: Probability vs Confirmation

Abstract

Carnap [1] aims to provide a formal explication of an informal concept (relation) he calls “confirmation”. He clarifies “E confirms H” in various ways, including: (∗) E provides some positive evidential support for H. His formal explication of “E confirms H” (in [1]) is: (1) E confirms H iff Pr(H | E) > r, where Pr is a suitable (“logical”) probability function, and r is a threshold value

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2011-05-09

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

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References found in this work

Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Logical Foundations of Probability (2nd edition).Rudolf Carnap - 1962 - Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Illusions About Uncertainty. [REVIEW]Isaac Levi - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.

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