Comments and Criticism: Measuring Confirmation and Evidence

Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Bayesian epistemology suggests various ways of measuring the support that a piece of evidence provides a hypothesis. Such measures are defined in terms of a subjective probability assignment, pr, over propositions entertained by an agent. The most standard measure (where “H” stands for “hypothesis” and “E” stands for “evidence”) is: the difference measure: d(H,E) = pr(H/E) - pr(H).0 This may be called a “positive (probabilistic) relevance measure” of confirmation, since, according to it, a piece of evidence E qualitatively confirms a hypothesis H if and only if pr(H/E) > pr(H), where qualitative disconfirmation is characterized by replacing “>” with “ “ with “=”. Other more or less standard positive relevance measures that have been proposed are: the log-ratio measure: r(H,E) = log[pr(H/E)/pr(H)] and the log-likelihood-ratio measure: l(H,E) = log[pr(E/H)/pr(E/~H)].



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,377

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Causation, Association, and Confirmation.Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines - 2010 - In Stephan Hartmann, Marcel Weber, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Dennis Dieks & Thomas Uebe (eds.), Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: New Trends and Old Ones Reconsidered. Springer. pp. 37--51.
Confirmation theory.James Hawthorne - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier.
Evidential support and undermining: Revision of håkan törnebohm's theory of confirmation. [REVIEW]Harald Dickson - 1990 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 21 (1):163-182.
Focused correlation and confirmation.Gregory Wheeler - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):79-100.
Confirmation of scientific hypotheses as relations.Aysel Dogan - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):243 - 259.
Measuring confirmation and evidence.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):663-672.


Added to PP

106 (#141,649)

6 months
8 (#127,780)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

References found in this work

Problems of Old Evidence†.Ellery Eells - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (3-4):283-302.
Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.

Add more references