Comparative Probability, Comparative Confirmation, and the “Conjunction Fallacy”

Abstract

In the first edition of LFP, Carnap [2] undertakes a precise probabilistic explication of the concept of confirmation. This is where modern confirmation theory was born (in sin). Carnap was interested mainly in quantitative confirmation (which he took to be fundamental). But, he also gave (derivative) qualitative and comparative explications: • Qualitative. E inductively supports H. • Comparative. E supports H more strongly than E supports H . • Quantitative. E inductively supports H to degree r . Carnap begins by clarifying the explicandum (the informal “inductive support” concept) in various ways, including.

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Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University

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References found in this work

Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Logical Foundations of Probability (2nd edition).Rudolf Carnap - 1962 - Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Studies in the logic of confirmation.Carl A. Hempel - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.

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