Another Look at Reflection

Erkenntnis 88 (2):479-509 (2021)
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Abstract

Reflection principles are of central interest in the development of axiomatic theories. Whereas they are independent statements they appear to have a specific epistemological status. Our trust in those principles is as warranted as our trust in the axioms of the system itself. This paper is an attempt in clarifying this special epistemic status. We provide a motivation for the adoption of uniform reflection principles by their analogy to a form of the constructive \(\omega \) -rule. Additionally, we analyse the role of informal arithmetic and the conception of natural numbers as an inductive structure, also with regard to extra conceptual resources such as a primitive truth predicate.

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Martin Fischer
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

In Defense of the Implicit Commitment Thesis.Ethan Brauer - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.

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Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Philosophy and Model Theory.Tim Button & Sean P. Walsh - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Edited by Sean Walsh & Wilfrid Hodges.
Mathematical Thought and its Objects.Charles Parsons - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs.Georg Kreisel - 1967 - In Imre Lakatos (ed.), Problems in the philosophy of mathematics. Amsterdam,: North-Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 138--157.
HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic.Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):305-405.

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