Virtue Theory for Moral Enhancement

American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):89-102 (2021)
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Abstract

Our present moral traits are unable to provide the level of large-scale co-operation necessary to deal with risks such as nuclear proliferation, drastic climate change and pandemics. In order to survive in an environment with powerful and easily available technologies, some authors claim that we need to improve our moral traits with moral enhancement. But this is prone to produce paradoxical effects, be self-reinforcing and harm personal identity. The risks of moral enhancement require the use of a safety framework; such a framework should guarantee practical robustness to moral uncertainty, empirical adequacy, correct balance between dispositions, preservation of identity, and be sensitive to practical considerations such as emergent social effects. A virtue theory can meet all these desiderata. Possible frameworks incorporate them to variable degrees. The social value orientations framework is one of the most promising candidates.

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Joao Fabiano
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Enhancing Virtue without Becoming Ned Flanders?Jon Rueda - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):121-124.
Why Moral Enhancement is Unavoidably Normative.Paul Rezkalla - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):105-106.
Identity, Virtue Theory, and the Death of Moral Enhancement.Davide Battisti & Federico Bina - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):114-116.

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