The Subtraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass

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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):50-57 (2009)
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Abstract

Jonathan Schaffer has recently argued that there can be objects having only mass. We show that his argument is either invalid or question begging.

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00318205

DOI

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00309.x

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Author Profiles

David Efird
PhD: Oxford University; Last affiliation: University of York
Tom Stoneham
University of York

Citations of this work

Negative Properties—Negative Objects?David Hommen - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):395-412.

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