Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):273 - 279 (2007)

Authors
Ross Cameron
University of Virginia
Abstract
I consider David Efird and Tom Stoneham's recent version of the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism, the view that there could have been no concrete objects at all. I argue that the two premises of their argument are only jointly acceptable if the quantifiers in one range over a different set of objects from those which the quantifiers in the other range over, in which case the argument is invalid. So either the argument is invalid or we should not accept both its premises.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.484.x
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References found in this work BETA

Maximality and Intrinsic Properties.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.
There Might Be Nothing.Thomas Baldwin - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):231–238.
The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism.Tom Stoneham - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (6):303 - 325.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Composition and the Cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.
Is Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting?David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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The Subtraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass.David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):50-57.
Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron.David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):132-137.
Berkeley and the Argument From Conceiving.Robert Frederick - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:481-487.
The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism.Tom Stoneham - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (6):303 - 325.

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