Justifying metaphysical nihilism: A response to Cameron

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):132-137 (2009)
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Abstract

Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of 'concrete'. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions.

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Author Profiles

David Efird
PhD: Oxford University; Last affiliation: University of York
Tom Stoneham
University of York

Citations of this work

Continuity as a Guide to Possibility.Joshua Rasmussen - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):525-538.
Nothing.Naomi Thompson - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham

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