The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions--are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This volume presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the papers address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal (...) logic and its relations to necessary existence and to counterfactual reasoning. The general introduction locates the individual contributions in the wider context of the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality. (shrink)

The possible-worlds analysis of propositions identifies a proposition with the set of possible worlds where it is true. This analysis has the hitherto unnoticed consequence that a proposition depends for its existence on the existence of every proposition that entails it. This peculiar consequence places the possible-worlds analysis in conflict with the conjunction of two compelling theses. One thesis is that a phrase of the form ‘the proposition that S’ is a rigid designator. The other thesis is that a proposition (...) which is directly about an object – a singular proposition – depends for its existence on the existence of the object. I defend these theses and conclude that the cost of the possible-worlds analysis is prohibitively high. (shrink)

It seems that every singular proposition implies that the object it is singular with respect to exists. It also seems that some propositions are true with respect to possible worlds in which they do not exist. The puzzle is that it can be argued that there is contradiction between these two principles. In this paper, I explain the puzzle and consider some of the ways one might attempt to resolve it. The puzzle is important because it has implications concerning the (...) way we think about the relationship between a proposition and the claim that the proposition is true. (shrink)

This paper revisits the often debated question Can machines think? It is argued that the usual identification of machines with the notion of algorithm has been both counter-intuitive and counter-productive. This is based on the fact that the notion of algorithm just requires an algorithm to contain a finite but arbitrary number of rules. It is argued that intuitively people tend to think of an algorithm to have a rather limited number of rules. The paper will further propose a modification (...) of the above mentioned explication of the notion of machines by quantifying the length of an algorithm. Based on that it appears possible to reconcile the opposing views on the topic, which people have been arguing about for more than half a century. (shrink)

This introductory chapter gives a general survey of the research context, along with brief descriptions of the chapters collected here, indicating how they contribute to the three-year project which provided that context. Focusing on absolute notions of necessity and possibility, the project's principal aims were to explore the most fundamental questions and issues centred on them — ranging from scepticism about modal notions themselves, anti-realist view such as non-cognitivism, and the tenability of any sort of realism about modal facts, through (...) to questions about the metaphysics, logic, and epistemology of modality which any broadly realist view must answer. (shrink)

Metaphysical nihilism is the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects. Thomas Baldwin (1996) offers an argument for metaphysical nihilism. The premisses of the argument purport to provide a procedure of subtraction that can be iterated until we reach a world where no concrete objects exist. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1997) finds fault with Baldwin’s argument, modifies it, and claims to have proved metaphysical nihilism. My primary aim is to show that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s alleged proof rests on a false assumption. The (...) assumption is that, necessarily, if there are no concrete* objects (in the sense Rodriguez-Pereyra defines), then there are no concrete objects. My secondary aim, with which I begin, is to formulate and then strengthen a succinct version of the subtraction argument. (shrink)

My dissertation consists of three essays in the Metaphysics of Modality: In "A Puzzle about Truth and Singular Propositions," I consider two theses that seem to be true and then an argument for the conclusion that they form an inconsistent pair. One thesis is that a proposition that is singular with respect to a given object implies that the object exists. This is so because the proposition predicates something of the object. The other thesis is that some propositions are true (...) with respect to possible worlds in which they do not exist. An example is the negation of the proposition that Socrates is wise. This proposition is true with respect to possible worlds in which Socrates does not exist, but it does not exist in those worlds. ;In "Actualism, Ontological Dependence, and Possible Worlds," I consider Actualism, the doctrine that every possible object is an actual object. Plantinga has argued that the actualist is committed to the existence of unexemplified essences if he analyzes statements of modality by quantifying over possible worlds and over members of their domains. I argue that the actualist is committed to the existence of unexemplified essences even if he paraphrases statements of modality by quantifying only over possible worlds and actual objects. ;In "Possibilism and the Nature of Actuality," I consider Possibilism, the doctrine that there are possible objects that are not actual objects. Possibilism seems to be a coherent ontological doctrine. It is not Meinong's doctrine that there are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects. If one fails to distinguish between these two doctrines, then one's attempt to refute Possibilism might amount to an attack on a blatant contradiction. I illustrate this claim by arguing that the distinction between Possibilism and Meinong's doctrine has eluded Plantinga. I then consider the view that Possibilism is a consequence of Lewis's doctrine that 'actual' is an indexical term. I also argue that the sense in which Lewis said that 'actual' is indexical is an esoteric sense of the word, not a sense it ordinarily has. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Zu der Frage, von welcher Instanz oder welchem Sozialisationsagenten im Sport welche Wirkung ausgeht, finden sich kaum differenzierte Studien. In einer Fragebogenstudie wurden in Anlehnung an Goncalves Trainer und von ihnen trainierte Jugendliche zur Bedeutung verschiedener Sozialisationsagenten für das Sporttreiben der Jugendlichen, zu ihrer Haltung zum Thema Fairness sowie zu diversen sozialen Normen befragt. Beide Gruppen sprechen übereinstimmend dem Trainer hohe Bedeutung zu. Weitere Analysen zeigen, dass sich aus den beim Trainer wahrgenommenen sozialen Normen regressionsanalytisch ein relativ hoher Anteil (...) der entsprechenden Einstellungen der Jugendlichen hervorsagen lässt. Dies bestätigt die große Bedeutung der Trainer als Sozialisationsagenten. (shrink)

Excerpt from Rene Descartes Descartes zieht sich in die Niederlande zuruck. Naheres uber die dortigen Zustande. 2. Verwerfung aller dog matiscben Voraussetzungen. Allgemeine metaphysische Grundlegung. 3. Es fehlt ihr noch die systematische Durch bildung. 4. Beschaftigung mit den mannigfachsten natur wissenschaftlichen Problemen. Heitere Stimmung des Philo 80phen. 5. Ausarbeitung einer Weltbildungstheorie. Die Grunde, weswegen das _werk nicht veroffentlicht wird. 6. Uber Descartes' Beurteilung der wissenschaftlichen Ver dienste Galileis 7. Liebesverhaltnis zwischen Descartes und einer Hollanderin. 8. Herausgabe einer Reihe wissenschaft licher (...) Werke. Charakteristik der Abhandlung uber die Methode. 9 Die Dioptrik. Technische Begabung des Philo 80phen. 10. Uber die Meteore. Ll. Geometrie. Uber die Ausdehnung und Grenzen der mathematischen Wissenschaft. Hohere Analysis. Descartes' Verhaltnis zu den abstrakten Problemen der Mathematik. Unvollkommenheit der Natur philosophie. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The paper addresses some similarities and differences in the institutional set-up of the classical gold standard and European Monetary Union. I argue that giving up monetary nationalism and committing to the rules of either the gold standard or EMU initially seemed to restrict the scope of state action. Therefore, the euro – like previously the gold standard – provided some policy credibility. Policy credibility was a main determinant of capital market integration and low government borrowing costs in Europe under both (...) systems. However, I shall emphasize that the membership in the gold or euro club itself did not force reforms and spending cuts upon countries that faced crisis and debt problems. The article suggests that the institutional set-ups of the gold standard and EMU determined the degree of commitment to them and the way in which countries reacted to deal with debt problems. (shrink)

1. T. Wilhelm Wundt als deutscher Denker, von Felix Krueger. Wundts Prinzip der schöpferischen Synthese, von Friedrich Sander. Wundt und die Relativität, von August Kirschmann. Die Völkerpsychologie in Wundts Entwicklungsgang, von Hans Volkelt. Zur Geschichte des Leipziger Psychologischen Instituts, von Otto Klemm.--2. T. Die Stellung der Philosophie Wilhelm Wundts im 19. Jahrhundert, von Peter Petersen. Wundts Aktualitätstheorie, von Willi Nef. Die mechanische Naturerklärung und das Naturgesetz, von Friedrich Lipsius. Über die psychischen Elemente und ihre Bedeutung in der Lehre Wundts, von (...) Friedrich Kiesow. Stellung und Aufgabe von Wundts Völkerpsychologie und der Begriff des Volkes, von Walther Schmied-Kowarzik. (shrink)

Zufall und Kontingenz sind von der Geschichtswissenschaft bis in die Gegenwart nur sporadisch thematisiert worden. Deshalb hat sich der Autor der vorliegenden Arbeit eine doppelte Aufgabe gestellt: Diskutiert er zunachst Bedeutung und Funktion von Zufall / Kontingenz fur geschichtstheoretische Dimensionen, so interpretiert er daran anschliessend zwei Klassiker der Sozialgeschichte auf ihren methodisch-theoretischen und historiographischen Umgang mit den zu verhandelnden Phanomenen. Die zentrale These, die hinter dieser Untersuchung steht, lautet dabei: Zufall und Kontingenz sind nicht ausserliche, unbedeutende und methodisch auflosbare Scheinkategorien, (...) sondern vielmehr produktive und mitbegrundende Faktoren / Begriffe bei der Konstitution von Geschichten und historischer Erfahrung, durch deren Vernachlassigung oder Auflosung die Geschichtswissenschaft auf ihre methodischen Kosten zuruckgeworfen wird. Am theoretischen und historiographischen Umgang mit Zufall und Kontingenz lasst sich zeigen, wer was wie im Rahmen der Geschichtswissenschaft verstehen bzw. erklaren will. Die Haltung gegenuber dem Zufall ist der 'Offenbarungseid' der Theorie. (shrink)

The LNAI series reports state-of-the-art results in artificial intelligence research, development, and education, at a high level and in both printed and electronic form.

This paper examines the importance of aspirations as reference points in a multi-period decision-making context. After stating their personal aspiration level, 172 individuals made six sequential decisions among risky prospects as part of a choice experiment. The results show that individuals make different risky-choices in a multi-period compared to a single-period setting. In particular, individuals’ aspiration level is their main reference point during the early stages of decision-making, while their starting status (wealth level at the start of the experiment) becomes (...) the central reference point during the later stages of their multi-period decision-making. (shrink)