Genuine modal realism and the empty world

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):21-37 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX


We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility we term ‘metaphysical nihilism’. The issue should be important to the genuine modal realist because, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself intuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an argument with pre-theoretically credible premises, namely, the subtraction argument. Given the soundness of the subtraction argument, we show that there are two ways that the genuine modal realist can accommodate metaphysical nihilism: (i) by allowing for worlds containing only spatiotemporal points and (ii) by allowing for a world containing nothing but the null individual. On methodological grounds, we argue that the genuine modal realist should reject the former way but embrace the latter way.

Similar books and articles

Justifying metaphysical nihilism: A response to Cameron.David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):132-137.
Nothing.Naomi Thompson - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
The Accidental Properties of Numbers and Properties.Harold Noonan & Mark Jago - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):134-140.
Modal Humeanism and Arguments from Possibility.Margot Strohminger - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):391-401.
Here Goes Nothing.Barry Lee - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (1):27-45.


Added to PP

874 (#17,742)

6 months
170 (#20,321)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Efird
PhD: Oxford University; Last affiliation: University of York

Citations of this work

Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is metaphysical nihilism interesting?David Efird & Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Truthmaking and difference-making.David Lewis - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):602–615.
Against structural universals.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.
Ontology and ideology.W. V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (1):11 - 15.

View all 16 references / Add more references