Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158 (2011)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth
|
Keywords | Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 1333-1108 |
DOI | croatjphil201111211 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
Similar books and articles
Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism About Truth-Aptness?Massimiliano Vignolo - 2010 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):81-98.
Relativism and Ontology.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (148):278-290.
The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism. Or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
Habermas, Kantian Pragmatism, and Truth.Steven Levine - 2010 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 36 (6):677-695.
Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid.Stephen Barker - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2012-09-18
Total views
74 ( #157,670 of 2,519,860 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,012 of 2,519,860 )
2012-09-18
Total views
74 ( #157,670 of 2,519,860 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #406,012 of 2,519,860 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads