In Kelly J. Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Wiley-Blackwell (2015)

Douglas Edwards
Utica College
Filippo Ferrari
Universität Bonn
Is truth itself natural? This is an important question for both those working on truth and those working on naturalism. For theorists of truth, answering the question of whether truth is natural will tell us more about the nature of truth (or lack of it), and the relations between truth and other properties of interest. For those working on naturalism, answering this question is of paramount importance to those who wish to have truth as part of the natural order. In this paper, we focus primarily on the kinds of theories of truth that occupy the central positions in current debates about truth, namely correspondence theories, deflationary theories, epistemic theories, and pluralist theories, and aim to discern the extent to which truth is a natural property on each view.
Keywords Truth  Correspondence (theory of truth)  Coherence (theory of truth)  Superassertibility  Naturalism  David Lewis  Michael Lynch  Pluralism (theory of truth)  Deflationism (theory of truth)  Normativity
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The Value of Minimalist Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1103-1125.
From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.

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