The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values

In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press (2009)
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Abstract

There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.

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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

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