Knowing Your Mind by Making Up Your Mind Without Changing Your Mind, Too Much

Journal of Philosophical Research 47:133-146 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

At the center of much contemporary work on self-knowledge of our attitudes is a debate between Agentialists and Empiricists. Empiricists hold that first-person knowledge of one’s own attitudes possesses a broadly empirical basis, such as observation or inference. Agentialists insist that an account of self-knowledge must make sense of the intimate connection between knowing one’s attitudes and actively forming them in response to reasons. But it is plausible to suppose that a psychologically realistic account of self-knowledge will emphasize both active and passive elements. Focusing on the idea that we form self-ascriptions of belief on the basis of active deliberation, this paper outlines such a middle ground position.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,141

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Deferring to Others about One's Own Mind.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):432-452.
Agency and Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge.
On Knowing One's Own Mind.Sven Bernecker - 1997 - Dissertation, Stanford University
Reason and the first person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Self-knowledge and the First Person.Cynthia Macdonald - 2004 - In Maureen Sie, Marc Slors & Bert van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of one's own. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-09-15

Downloads
56 (#391,251)

6 months
12 (#321,633)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Casey Doyle
State University of New York at Binghamton

Citations of this work

Listening to algorithms: The case of self‐knowledge.Casey Doyle - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references